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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Trade sanctions occur when one polity institutes a policy that 
limits or prohibits trade with another polity to support a policy 
largely unrelated to trade.  Trade sanctions have a long history.  
Scholars often point to the Megarian Decree, in which Pericles 
banned all trade between his Athenian Empire and the state of 
Megara in 432 B.C.E., as one of the earliest uses of trade sanctions.1  
Some argue that Pericles hoped that using economic tools against 
Megara would prevent war with Sparta; others suggest that 
Pericles merely wanted to punish the Megarians for their support 
of Corinth—in either case the trade measure supported another 
policy.2  Most scholars agree that Pericles’s trade sanction 
contributed to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.3 
 
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania.  Sarah Krasny provided valuable 
research assistance for this Article. 
1 See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard 
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1168 n.18 (1987) (describing the trade 
limitations imposed by Pericles and their role in starting the Peloponnesian War); 
Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: An Overview, in 
SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 1 (Steve Chan & A. 
Cooper Drury eds., 2000) (describing the political motivations and the events 
arising out of the Megarian Decree). 
2 Chan & Drury, supra note 1, at 1. 
3 See, e.g., Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good: Inefficacy of the U.S. 
Unilateral Sanctions Against the Military Government of Burma/Myanmar, 7 WASH. U. 
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As could be expected of a practice engaged in for millennia, 
trade sanctions have generated voluminous literature.4  Many 
scholars have analyzed sanctions through economic theory or 
using quantitative explanation.5  Some have based their analyses 
on political science.6  Some, of course, have analyzed trade 
sanctions as a matter of law.7  Economics, international relations, 
and other disciplines have enriched legal analyses of trade 
sanctions.  While law has been happy to borrow from those 
disciplines, however, it has not yet turned to the tools of 
institutional sociologists. 
This Article takes that step.  Institutional sociologists have 
developed theories that explain the process whereby institutions 
converge.  Institutions, in turn, shape and guide behavior.  Thus, 
changes in institutions will lead to changes in behavior, and 
convergences in institutions should lead to similar behavior.  If a 
goal of trade sanctions is to force another nation to act in a manner 
similar to the sanctioning nation and its peers, then this 
sociological theory of isomorphism could have powerful 
explanatory and predictive effects. 
In order to determine if sociological theories of institutional 
convergence apply to trade sanctions, this Article first must 
determine the objectives sought by nations that apply sanctions.8  
There are several goals; to speak of or analyze trade sanctions as a 
unitary phenomenon is for the most part nonsensical.  One type of 
trade sanction does seek to bring the behavior of target nations into 
 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 455, 461 (2008) (stating that barring trade between Megara 
and allies eventually led to the Peloponnesian War); see also THUCYDIDES, THE 
LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 80 
(Robert B. Strassler ed., Richard Crawley trans., Free Press 1996) (stating that the 
Spartans demanded rescission of the Megarian decree to prevent war). 
4 A useful bibliography can be found at Global Policy Forum, Sanctions 
Bibliography, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/bibliog.htm (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
5 See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 
(3d ed. 2007) (providing a database of economic sanctions and evaluating the 
relative efficacy of these measures). 
6 See, e.g., DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC 
STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999) (discussing the role of economic 
coercion in international relations). 
7 See, e.g., MICHAEL P. MALLOY, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 145–204 (2001) (discussing the role of economic sanctions in 
contemporary U.S. legal practice). 
8 See infra Section 2. 
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line with the behavior of sanctioning nations and their peers,9 and 
thus presents the possibility for examination through the lens of 
theories of isomorphism.  A paradigmatic example of this type of 
sanction is the United States’ embargo of the Republic of Cuba; this 
Article briefly reviews the history of that island.10  The Article then 
explains three different but non-exclusive theories of isomorphism: 
normative isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive 
isomorphism.11  Application of those theories to the embargo of 
Cuba explains the failure of that particular trade sanction.12  
Moreover, theories of isomorphism suggest that unilateral 
sanctions will often fail to cause the desired change in behavior.13 
2. TYPES OF TRADE SANCTIONS 
As the debate over the reasons for Pericles’s sanctions of 
Megara illustrates, nations can impose economic sanctions for a 
variety of reasons.  Reasons that a nation might impose economic 
sanctions include commercial impulses, denial of a discrete good 
or piece of technology, rule enforcement, and expression of 
preferences.  A country may also impose sanctions as a means of 
causing another country to change its behavior.  Because nations 
impose different types of sanctions to achieve different goals (or as 
a response to different impulses), evaluations of “success” or 
“costs” require careful distinction among these types. 
2.1. Commercial Impulses 
A broad set of commercial impulses explains one type of trade 
sanction.  Of these commercial impulses, protectionism is 
discussed most often.14  A ban imposed by Australia, for example, 
on uncooked salmon from the Pacific Rim of North America was 
ostensibly imposed in order to prevent the introduction of exotic 
 
9 See infra Section 2.5. 
10 See infra Section 3. 
11 See infra Section 4. 
12 See infra Section 5. 
13 See infra Section 5.4. 
14 E.g., Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the 
Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2131–32, 2136–45 (1995) (discussing attempts 
by the United States to protect environmental interests by utilizing legislation that 
restricted specific types of trade with neighboring countries). 
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diseases to Australian fish stock.15  However, because Australia 
imposed a ban on uncooked salmon but did not impose a similar 
ban on herring or ornamental fin-fish, both of which presented as 
much, or even more, of a risk to Australian fish stock, and because 
the scientific study Australia used to justify its ban did not contain 
an evaluation of the likelihood of the spread of disease, the World 
Trade Organization found that the sanction imposed by Australia 
was actually intended to protect the domestic Australian 
industry.16  Similarly, the World Trade Organization found no 
scientific support for a Japanese ban on apples from the United 
States ostensibly imposed to protect Japanese apples from larvae of 
the coddling moth, and found instead that the measure was 
unreasonably protectionist.17  One of the earliest rulings within the 
World Trade Organization found that a ban on reformulated 
gasoline that did not meet specified quality standards was not in 
fact an environmental measure but was actually a protectionist 
action by the United States.18 
 
15 See Matthew D. Taylor, The WTO Panel Decision on Australia’s Salmon Import 
Guidelines: Evidence that the SPS Agreement can Effectively Protect Human Health 
Interests, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 473, 473 (2000) (describing an Australian 
measure, the Quarantine Proclamation 86A, that was enacted to protect diverse 
recreational fisheries in Australia). 
16 Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Salmon, ¶ 170, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998).  Canada complained to the World 
Trade Organization that the Australian sanction violated Australia’s obligations 
pursuant to its membership in that organization.  See Andrew P. Thomson, 
Australia—Salmon and Compliance Issues Surrounding the SPS Agreement: Sovereign 
Acceptance and Measure Adaptation, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 717, 725–26 (2002) 
(describing Canada and Australia’s agreements before the World Trade 
Organization).  The World Trade Organization has a process for resolving 
complaints lodged by members against other members; that process resulted in 
the finding by the World Trade Organization.  For discussions and explanations 
of the dispute settlement process within the World Trade Organization, see 
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1–
57 (1997); Carlos M. Vásquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance 
with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 555, 556–62 
(2002). 
17 Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶ 9.1, 
WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998); see Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 
2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 422–39 (2004) (discussing the dispute 
between the United States and Japan); Joseph P. Whitlock, Japan—Measures 
Affecting Agricultural Products: Lessons for Future SPS and Agricultural Trade 
Disputes, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 741, 748–54 (2002) (discussing the dispute). 
18 Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, ¶ 4.8 WT/052/9 (May 20, 1996).  The United States—against the explicit 
advice of its own International Trade Representative—created different, 
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The law regarding these types of sanctions is relatively clear.  
The international trade regime, as administered by the World 
Trade Organization, is built on two strict foundational 
requirements and one softer requirement.19  The first strict 
requirement, the “most favored nation” principal, requires that all 
participating nations receive equal treatment at the border:  nations 
cannot discriminate among goods on the basis of country of 
origin.20  The second strict requirement, the “national treatment” 
principle, requires that once inside the customs territory of a nation 
all goods from participating nations shall receive the same 
treatment as goods that originated domestically.21  The third, 
somewhat softer requirement is that all barriers at the border be 
converted into tariffs, so that as those tariffs are negotiated 
downward there eventually will be unfettered trade among all of 
the participants in the international trade regime.22 
 
discriminatory standards for gasoline originating outside of the United States; 
substantial evidence suggested that Congress worked with domestic producers to 
create a protectionist sanction.  See Philip M. Nichols, Participation of 
Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade Organization: Extension of Standing in 
World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 295, 297 n.14 (1996) (describing the protectionist nature of the measure). 
19 For a discussion of the administration of the international trade regime by 
the World Trade Organization, see John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, 
Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000); G. 
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the 
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995). 
20 See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 230, 231 (1992) 
(referring to the most favored nation requirement as a “bedrock” of the 
international trade regime); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO 
Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 407 (1998) (referring to the most 
favored nation requirement as the “first and most basic provision” of the 
international trade regime). 
21 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the 
Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 271 
(1997) (placing national treatment and most favored nation principle “[a]t the 
core” of the international trade regime); Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax 
Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 139, 165 (2003) (describing national treatment as one of the “key 
principles” of the international trade regime). 
22 See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 379, 439 (1996) 
(discussing how the General Agreement intended to promote equal competition 
by forbidding trade barriers other than tariffs). 
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A scattering of exceptions perforate these requirements.23  One 
exception specifically allows countries to sanction trade for 
commercial purposes.  Through a provision known as the “escape 
clause,” sanctions may be imposed when unforeseen events lead to 
an increase in imports that threatens or foreseeably threatens 
serious injury to a domestic industry.24  If a country uses the escape 
clause to sanction goods from another country, then that country 
may in turn impose increased tariffs equal in value to the sanction 
on goods from the first country.25  The escape clause thus provides 
a balanced measure whereby countries can react to short term 
changes in the trade environment without renegotiating the 
entirety of the international trade regime.26 
The purpose of sanctions imposed to promote the commercial 
prosperity of a nation dictates the measurement of the “success” of 
such sanctions.  Scholars and policymakers would attempt to find a 
causal link between the sanction and domestic economic growth, 
and would then try to measure the amount of growth attributable 
to the sanction.  If the sanctions lead to economic growth, then they 
would be considered successful.27 
2.2. Denial of a Discrete Piece of Technology or Input 
A related type of sanction seeks to deny a discrete piece of 
technology or input to a specific actor or set of international actors.  
The United States, for example, “has three export control 
regulations in place that prohibit the unlicensed ‘export’ or ‘re-
 
23 See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 335 (1990) 
(comparing the exceptions to “a crust of barnacles, weighing it down with 
provisos and exclusions”). 
24 Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 
818–19 (2001).  Charnovitz notes that “[t]he trading system has always recognized 
the need for a safety valve to let governments derogate from trade rules.”  Id. at 
818. 
25 See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape 
Clause, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 474–75 (2005) (demonstrating that the counter-tariff 
helps governments exercise restraint in use of the escape clause). 
26 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
55 (2005) (stating that the escape clause provides necessary flexibility to an 
“immutable” treaty commitment). 
27 Theory suggests, of course, that sanctions would actually diminish overall 
domestic growth.  See Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative 
Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 78–80 (1998) 
(explaining the economic justification for free trade). 
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export’ of certain U.S. originated technology, equipment, software 
or information for reasons of national security.”28  One of these, the 
Atomic Energy Act, prohibits the export of nuclear technology to 
nations that have conducted unauthorized testing of nuclear 
weapons.29  Similarly, Article 17 of the Foreign Trade Laws of the 
People’s Republic of China allows China to “adopt any necessary 
measures to safeguard” national security “[w]ith regard to the 
import and export of goods and technologies related to fissile and 
fusion material or the substances from which such material is 
derived.”30  In both cases, the purpose of prohibiting trade in 
nuclear technology is to protect national security. 
Just as the international trade regime allows for trade sanctions 
to protect domestic industry, so too does it allow for protection of 
national security.31  The World Trade Organization allows parties 
to not make required disclosures of information if such disclosures 
threaten national security.32  More pertinently to the evaluation of 
sanctions, it also allows parties to deviate from the foundational 
requirements of nondiscrimination in order to protect essential 
national security.33  The boundaries of “essential” national security 
remain somewhat unclear: the few disputes that have arisen 
regarding this exception have settled before adjudicators could 
hear the disputes and issue rulings.34  The exception does, 
 
28 Sonia Baldia, Intellectual Property in Global Outsourcing: The Art of the 
Transfer, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 499, 520 n.64 (2007). 
29 See Recent Legislation, Foreign Relations Law—Nuclear Nonproliferation—
Congress Authorizes the President to Waive Restrictions on Nuclear Exports to India, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 2020, 2021 (2007) (discussing the United States-India Peaceful 
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (USIPAECA) and its impact on the 
Atomic Energy Act). 
30 Foreign Trade Law, art. 17  (P.R.C.) (2007), translation available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383624.htm. 
31 See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 451–52 (2008) (discussing national security 
exceptions in international trade rules). 
32 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can 
Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 283, 290 (2003) 
(discussing the national security exception). 
33 Id.; Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and 
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 424, 437 (1999) (noting the difficulty of defining “essential” national 
security concerns). 
34 See Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National 
Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 376–77 (2003) (stating 
that the few disputes arising in the World Trade Organization have not yielded 
rules because the parties settled before adjudication); C. O’Neal Taylor, Impossible 
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however, articulate specific items or circumstances that fall within 
the term:  fissionable materials, military arms or supplies, and 
anything during a time of war.35  Thus, the U.S. and Chinese 
sanctions would seem to be within the rules of the international 
trade regime.  While less measured and certainly less settled than 
provisions regarding commercial sanctions, the national security 
exception similarly creates flexibility in the otherwise inflexible 
international trade regime.36 
The measurement of success should be much clearer:  the 
extent to which the sanctioned nations obtain (or do not obtain) the 
prohibited technology or good.  If, for example, one nation 
prohibits the export of encryption technology to another, then 
success occurs if that second nation does not obtain the encryption 
technology.37  Whether or not the encryption technology obtained 
by the sanctioned country actually originated in the sanctioning 
country would be of little concern, since the sole concern of the 
sanctioning country is to deny access to encryption technology.38  
Unlike the evaluation of the successes and costs of sanctions 
intended to protect a domestic industry, this evaluation looks 
outward, at the effects in another country, rather than inward, at 
 
Cases: Lessons From the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 309, 380 (2007) (noting that parties have avoided determination of the 
boundaries of the exception). 
35 Kontorovich, supra note 32, at 290. 
36 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the 
WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a 
New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413, 417 
(2001) (“The security exception represents an indispensable escape mechanism or 
safety valve without which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would 
cease to exist.  Nations are unwilling to participate in such agreements without 
the assurance that they have retained the right to protect their sovereignty from 
external threat.”).  Andrew Guzman argues that concerns about the abuse of a 
poorly defined security exception are overblown: “The ability of political 
constraints to cabin abusive practices is demonstrated by their effectiveness in 
limiting the use of the least disciplined of WTO exceptions: the national security 
exception. . . . Simply put, the fact that the exception is not regularly used 
indicates that it is simply too costly to invoke when the national security 
justification is not plausible.”  Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: Health and Safety at 
the WTO, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36–37 (2004). 
37 See generally Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 319, 330–31 (2005) (discussing the U.S. prohibition on export of encryption 
technology to certain countries). 
38 See Mai-Trâm B. Dinh, Note, The U.S. Encryption Export Policy: Taking the 
Byte Out of the Debate, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 375, 393 (1998) (noting that 
criminals circumvent the U.S. sanctions on encryption technology). 
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the effects inside the sanctioning country.  To use the same tests 
and metrics on these two very different types of sanctions would 
be meaningless. 
2.3. Rule Enforcement 
Similar questions are often asked of another closely related 
type of sanction:  those imposed to enforce an internationally-
agreed upon rule.  The Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) offers a well-known example.39  The 
Convention prohibits the export of ivory from elephants, as part of 
an effort to enforce provisions aimed at restoring the numbers of 
wild elephants in Africa and Asia.40  In particular, the Convention 
authorizes signatories to penalize non-signatories that engage in 
trade in elephant ivory.41  This convention is hardly unique; several 
international conventions regarding environmental or 
sustainability issues rely on trade sanctions for enforcement.42 
The international trade regime itself uses trade sanctions within 
its dispute settlement process.43  As Steve Charnovitz notes, “the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
and its annexes do not actually employ the term ‘trade sanction.’”44  
Charnovitz goes on to point out that 
even without the term “sanction,” that is what the WTO can 
impose. . . . [T]he purpose of the WTO-authorized action is 
 
39 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, available at http://www.cites.org 
/eng/disc/text.shtml. 
40 See Andrew J. Heimert, Note, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE L.J. 
1473, 1478–79 (1995) (discussing international legal measures to protect elephant 
populations after CITES). 
41 See Mario Del Baglivo, CITES at the Crossroad: New Ivory Sales and Sleeping 
Giants, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 289–90 (2003) (discussing the 
responsibilities CITES imposes on its signatories with regards to policing illegal 
ivory trading). 
42 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument 
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 689 (1999) (noting that several 
international conventions rely on trade sanctions including CITES, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the International Whaling Convention, and the Straddling Stocks 
Agreement). 
43 Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The 
World Trade Organization’s Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to 
AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 353, 361 n.35 (2004). 
44 Charnovitz, supra note 24, at 792. 
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to induce compliance, and that is properly called a 
“sanction.”  With the advent of the WTO, the trade policy 
community has increasingly employed the term “sanction” 
to describe what [the dispute settlement process] 
authorizes.45 
The law concerning these types of sanctions appears woefully 
underdeveloped.46  Obviously, the international trade regime 
recognizes the legality of sanctions imposed or authorized by the 
international trade regime.47  The trade rules also include a specific 
exception for sanctions imposed in compliance with the United 
Nations.48  The trade regime does not include any other exceptions.  
In theory, this should lead to the application of Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention: if treaties impose conflicting obligations then 
signatories are bound to follow the dictates of the later-created 
treaty.49  That reading of international law, however, would vitiate 
dozens of carefully negotiated enforcement provisions in 
international agreements.50  However, “it bears noting that to date 
 
45 Id. at 793. 
46 Unlike the law of the preceding two types of sanctions—for each of which 
a body of rules exists, even though the meaning and application of those rules still 
generates argument and scholarly debate—the rules with respect to enforcement  
of sanctions appear incomplete. 
47 See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 
92 VA. L. REV. 251, 259 (2006) (“Sanctions are thereby legitimized, while unilateral 
counter-retaliation is not. . . .  By centralizing the authority to use sanctions, the 
WTO system increases enforcement by making threats of sanctions more 
credible.”).  Of course, the fact that retaliatory sanctions are legal under the trade 
regime’s rules does not mean that the sanctions actually contribute to the goals of 
the international trade regime; many scholars point out the inherent conflict 
between the trading system’s goals and its methods.  See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra 
note 24, at 792 (arguing that retaliatory trade sanctions “undermine the trading 
system”); Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and 
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 620–21 (2000) (suggesting 
that trade sanctions do not achieve the trading regime’s goals in some 
circumstances); Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International 
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights 
Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1838 (2002) (“[O]ne of the remedies for 
noncompliance—retaliatory sanctions—causes the very trade distortions that the 
WTO was designed to avert.”). 
48 See Kontorovich, supra note 32, at 290 (describing the exception). 
49 Sabrina Safrin, Comment, Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the 
World Trade Organization Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 612–13 (2002). 
50 See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the 
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 498 (1994) (discussing the “fruitful interplay 
between unilateral and multilateral action” in such international agreements, and 
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not a single multilateral environmental agreement or government 
action taken to implement such an agreement has been found to 
violate the WTO Agreements.”51  Clearly, the international 
community has not yet sufficiently sorted out the law regarding 
sanctions intended to enforce agreed-upon rules. 
The metric of “success” with respect to these types of sanctions 
should be no different than that of any other measure designed to 
compel compliance with a rule: the extent to which those from 
whom compliance is expected do in fact comply.  Mario Del 
Baglivo, for example, suggests that “[m]ost observers credit the 
CITES Ivory Ban with virtually ending the poaching crisis 
throughout Africa.”52  If this is true, then the sanctioning of trade in 
ivory may be “successful.” 
2.4. Expression of Preferences 
A fourth set of reasons for trade sanctions could reflect 
collective attitudes and preferences.53  Massachusetts’s sanctions on 
Burma, for example, hardly spring from a protectionist impulse—
rather, those sanctions could reflect a collective distaste for the 
political regime in Burma.54  Similarly, it is quite possible that the 
majority of people in the United States could feel so much 
 
citing the potential dangers in overriding it); A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty 
Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American 
Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 37, 63 (1997) (discussing how developed 
countries can make unilateral use of export bans on unsustainable timber 
products but will have much more difficulty with import bans). 
51 Safrin, supra note 49, at 623–24 (pointing to several “formidable 
multilateral environmental agreements” that predate the international trade 
regime but have not been questioned by that regime). 
52 Del Baglivo, supra note 41, at 293. 
53 See Karl E. Case, Musgrave’s Vision of the Public Sector: The Complex 
Relationship Between Individual, Society and State in Public Good Theory, 32 J. ECON. & 
FIN. 348, 353–54 (2008) (explaining theories of collective attitudes and noting the 
role of law in expressing these attitudes). 
54 See Lucien Dhooge, The Wrong Way to Mandalay: The Massachusetts Selective 
Purchasing Act and the Constitution, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 387, 410 n.168 (2000) (noting 
that the Massachusetts legislature felt that Massachusetts had a moral duty not to 
deal with Burma, and quoting State Senator Marian Walsh as “urg[ing] her 
colleagues to ‘recognize the responsibility we have to set a tone for civil rights 
across the globe.’”).  The United States Supreme Court struck down 
Massachusetts’s sanctions on the narrow grounds that existing federal laws 
sanctioning Burma preempted the action by the state.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreing 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000); see also The Supreme Court: 1999 Term—
Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 349, 353–55 (2000) (discussing the case). 
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revulsion at the atrocities committed in Darfur by the Sudanese 
government that they simply would not want entities within their 
jurisdiction to interact with that government.55 
 Markets, and by extension David Ricardo’s economic theory 
justifying international trade,56 encourage the expression of 
preferences57 and it therefore would be somewhat distortive to not 
allow such expressions.58  The international trade regime, however, 
does not accommodate these types of sanctions.  Unlike the 
flexibility displayed with respect to domestic industries and 
national security, the trade regime displays little flexibility with 
respect to local expression of preferences.59 
Notwithstanding the rules against these types of sanctions, 
they continue to be imposed.  Unlike each of the other types of 
sanctions described in this Section, no outcome generated by these 
types of sanctions indicates success or failure.  The sanction does 
not attempt to achieve a particular outcome.  Rather, the sanction 
reflects an internal aspect of the collective, an internal preference 
 
55 See International Crisis Group, Poll Shows Americans Support U.S. Role in 
Darfur, June 1, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm 
?l=1&id=3492&m=1 (reporting results of a survey that indicate that most people 
in the United States morally oppose the actions of the Sudanese government in 
Darfur). 
56 See Tomer Broude, Taking “Trade and Culture” Seriously: Geographic 
Indications and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 657 
n.104 (2005) (noting David Ricardo’s “famed exposition of the principle of 
comparative advantage”). 
57 Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics and Race-Based 
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1192 (1998) (“Markets allow an 
almost-democratic expression of preferences, including the preferences of 
society’s worst-off.  Just as importantly, markets will punish policy-makers who 
ignore them.”).  Indeed, an Edgeworth-Bowley box—used to measure the 
allocation of resources when people trade—explicitly takes preferences into 
account as one of its axes.  See Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for 
the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577, 604–08 (1987) (explaining the Edgeworth-
Bowley box’s representativeness of the relationship between individual 
preferences and social efficiency). 
58 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. 
U. L. REV. 4, 4 (1994) (“The two most important institutions in our system, 
democracy and the market, make individual preference decisive in the formation 
of policy and the allocation of resources.  Without acknowledgment of preference, 
democracy and the market as we know them could not exist.”). 
59 See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 659 
(1996) (“[T]he rigidity of this new dispute settlement system may have a darker 
aspect: it may become so inflexible as to actually hinder the prospects for free 
trade.”). 
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given voice through operation of law.60  The critical measurement, 
therefore, also looks at the processes inside the collective and asks 
whether the sanction does in fact legitimately and accurately reflect 
the preferences of the individuals that compromise that collective.61 
2.5. Sanctions That Seek to Change Behavior 
Each of the types of sanctions discussed so far has a different 
purpose; axiomatically, the success of each would be measured in 
different ways, and the costs and benefits of each would constitute 
very different discussions.  To simply evaluate trade sanctions writ 
large would more often than not constitute a meaningless exercise.  
A fifth type of trade sanction is equally unique, in which the goal is 
to change the behavior of an individual actor.62 
These sanctions differ from those intended to enforce an 
internationally-agreed upon rule in at least two important ways.63  
Such sanctions tend to be unilateral, or imposed by a small group 
of nations.64  Moreover, these sanctions are intended to force a 
broad change in the behavior of target countries rather than 
 
60 See, e.g., Alejandra Carvajal, State and Local “Free Burma” Laws: The Case for 
Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 257, 268 (1998) (“The 
Massachusetts law is very straightforward in that sense: Massachusetts morally 
opposes the Burmese regime and therefore will do no business with the regime or 
its business partners.”). 
61 See Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Joyce L. Tong, Diversity or Cacophony? The 
Continuing Debate Over New Sources of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1349, 
1373 (2004) (“If a country can demonstrate the truly democratic character of 
domestic choices including some degree of inclusiveness of non-domestic 
constituencies than [sic] these choices must trump requirements of legal 
consistency.”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International 
Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 398, 411 (1996) (“The general public interest 
of the citizens cannot even be known by governments without enabling their 
citizens to freely express their individual preferences in transparent, democratic 
decision-making processes and open markets.”) (emphasis omitted).  Nicolaïdis 
and Tong suggest that “we must applaud when the WTO Appellate Body tells a 
country how to come to a decision rather than what decisions it is allowed to 
make.”  Nicolaïdis & Tong, supra, at 1373. 
62 See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE 
HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 12 (1988) (identifying changing behavior of target 
countries as a purpose of some sanctions). 
63 See supra notes 39–52 and accompanying text (describing sanctions 
intended to enforce agreed upon rules). 
64 See Roger Normand & Christoph Wilcke, Human Rights, Sanctions, and 
Terrorist Threats: The United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq, 11 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 319 (2001) (“[H]istorically only powerful nations have 
applied sanctions to force weaker nations to change.”). 
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compliance with a single rule or regime.65  The statements of a U.S. 
legislator supporting unilateral sanctions of this type illustrate the 
breadth of changes sought: 
The purpose of sanctions is to change behavior.  The 
changes we seek, in partnership with the Burmese people, 
are these: concrete, irreversible steps toward reconciliation 
and democratization that include the full, unfettered 
participation of the National League for Democracy and 
ethnic minorities; ending attacks on ethnic minorities; and 
the immediate, unconditional release of all prisoners of 
conscience, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San 
Suu Kyi.  The regime also needs to know that a sham 
Constitutional process and token prisoner releases will not 
be regarded by anyone as progress toward these goals.66 
The United States’ sanctions on Cuba are a paradigmatic 
example of this type of sanction.67  The sanctions explicitly embrace 
the purpose of effectuating change in Cuba.  The Cuban 
Democracy Act, the first of the two acts dealing with sanctions on 
Cuba, flatly states, “It should be the policy of the United States . . . 
to seek a peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of 
economic growth in Cuba through the careful application of 
sanctions directed at the Castro government and support for the 
Cuban people.”68 
The later-enacted Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(Libertad) Act amplifies these goals and introduces the idea that 
 
65 See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, Condemning Khartoum: The Illinois Divestment Act 
and Foreign Relations, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 297 (2006) (“[T]he intent of the Illinois 
Act is to establish an economic boycott of a single identified country for the 
purpose of encouraging it to change its policies with respect to its governance of a 
single province within its national borders.”); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 677, 699 
(2000) (“‘The purpose of our sanctions, however, is to spur changes in policy.’”) 
(quoting U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks Before the 
American-Iranian Council (Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://secretary.state.gov 
/www/statements/2000/000317.html). 
66 Press Release, Senator Mitch McConnell, McConnell, Feinstein Call for 
Renewed Sanctions against Burmese Junta (June 14, 2007), available at 
http://mcconnell.senate.gov/print_record.cfm?id=276921 (quoting Senator 
McConnell). 
67 The U.S. sanctions on Cuba are thoroughly described in Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419 (1996). 
68 Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6002. 
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Cuba should conduct itself similarly to other countries in the 
region, stating, “The purposes of this Act are . . . to assist the 
Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as 
in joining the community of democratic countries that are 
flourishing in the Western Hemisphere.”69  The U.S. sanctions on 
Cuba, therefore, are intended as an application of economic force 
that will cause Cuba to align its behaviors with principles such as 
democracy in manners similar to the behaviors of neighboring 
countries. 
The legal structure governing such sanctions is confused, to the 
extent that it exists.70  A substantial amount of law governs the use 
of physical force to effectuate broad changes,71 but the same is not 
true of trade sanctions.  As Michael Malloy points out: 
The general impermissibility of the use or threat of armed 
force has to some degree increased the relative importance 
of economic sanctions, a form of economic warfare.  This is 
not necessarily a fortuitous development.  The less obvious 
costs of economic sanctions, as compared to those of armed 
force, may encourage a facile resort to economic sanctions 
that would have been intolerable in the case of armed 
force.72 
Developing a means of thinking about the successes, and costs, 
of these types of sanctions is the purpose of this Article.  To do so, 
closer attention will be paid to the U.S. sanctions on Cuba.  The 
context for those sanctions begins several centuries in the past. 
 
69 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6022. 
70 Ironically, the indiscriminate infliction of injury on civilians for purposes of 
eroding their support of an existing regime or to incite those civilians to demand 
political change falls within many definitions of terrorism, and is soundly 
rebuked by most international bodies.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1566, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (defining and condemning terrorism). 
71 See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information 
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1033–38 (2007) (describing laws of war); 
Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in 
Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 39 (2000) (describing limits on the use of force against 
civilians); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International 
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J., 1, 3 (2002) (“All nations around the 
world agree on some concept of civilian inviolability.”). 
72 Michael P. Malloy, Où Est Votre Chapeau? Economic Sanctions and Trade 
Regulation, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371, 371–72 (2003) (citation omitted). 
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3. CUBA 
Humans have occupied the Cuban island for approximately 
4,500 years.73  In around 300 A.D., the Taíno tribe arrived in Cuba, 
supplanting those tribes that already lived on the island.74  When 
Cristóbal Colón arrived from Spain in 1492, the Taíno greeted him 
to the island, which he subsequently claimed for Spain.75 
For the next four hundred years Spain administered Cuba as a 
colony.76  By 1548, only about five hundred Taíno survived (from a 
population estimated at around one million when Colón arrived).77  
African slaves arrived in the 1550s, and slavery persisted until 
1886.78  Slavery brought hundreds of thousands of persons to 
Cuba.  By 1846, thirty-six percent of the population was enslaved 
and freed descendents of slaves constituted another seventeen 
percent—together more than half of the population of Cuba.79  
Slaves had limited rights, and people of color faced numerous 
restrictions on personal and commercial activities.80 
 
73 JOSE M. GUARCH DELMONTE, ENSAYO DE RECONSTRUCCIÓN ETNO-HISTO ́RICA 
DEL TAÍNO DE CUBA 14 (1973). 
74 See FRANCINE JACOBS, THE TAINOS: THE PEOPLE WHO WELCOMED COLUMBUS 
18–19 (1992) (describing the genesis of Taino society in Cuba). 
75 Elizabeth de Lima-Dantas, Historical Setting, in CUBA, A COUNTRY STUDY 1, 
6–7 (James D. Randolph ed., 1987); see also DeAnna Marie Rivera, Note, Taino 
Sacred Sites: An International Comparative Analysis for a Domestic Solution, 20 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 446 (2003) (describing the meeting of Colón and the Taíno). 
76 See RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A NEW HISTORY (2005); CLIFFORD L. STATEN, THE 
HISTORY OF CUBA (2003) (discussing the history of Spanish occupation of Cuba). 
77 JACOBS, supra note 74, at 58, 91.  In the mid-1500s a Taíno chief named 
Guamá and his wife Habaguanex led a guerrilla war against the Spaniards, but 
the Spaniards won and essentially annihilated the Taíno peoples. 
78 See Alejandro de la Fuente, Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba: The 
Tannenbaum Debate Revisited, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 339, 353–68 (2004) (discussing 
the history of slavery in Cuba); see generally LAIRD W. BERGAD, THE COMPARATIVE 
HISTORIES OF SLAVERY IN BRAZIL, CUBA, AND THE UNITED STATES (2007). 
79 Ada Ferrer, Cuba, 1898: Rethinking Race, Nation, and Empire, 73 RADICAL 
HIST. REV. 22, 23 (1999).  More slaves were forced into Cuba than were forced into 
the entirety of the United States.  See Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: 
Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 11, 26 (2001) (reporting that Cuba absorbed nearly 140% of the number of 
Africans forced into the United States between 1790 and 1867).  See also Jenny S. 
Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117 
YALE L.J. 550, 602–10 (2008) (discussing the slave trade into Cuba). 
80 Ferrer, supra note 79, at 23; de la Fuente, supra note 78, at 356 (outlining the 
rights and restrictions of people of color). 
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Spain perceived Cuba’s role within its empire as a producer of 
tobacco, and later, sugar.81  Spain jealously guarded this trade, in 
part through the operation of trading monopolies and in part 
through severe restriction on the ability of persons in Cuba to trade 
outside of Cuba.  The monopolies operated until the early 1800s, at 
which time the Creole population82 was given limited rights to 
trade, along with limited representation in Spain in accordance 
with the Spanish Constitution of 1812 (a weak constitution that 
was later revoked).83  Even after some loosening of trade 
restrictions, native-born Cubans generally did not exert substantial 
political control over the island. 
The relationship between Cuba and the United States was 
somewhat complicated.84  As other former colonies achieved 
independence, the United States warned European nations away 
from interfering, asserting that these new nations fell within the 
United States’ sphere of influence.85  With specific reference to 
Cuba, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams wrote that the islands 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico are “natural appendages to the North 
American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our 
shores . . . has become an object of transcendent importance to the 
 
81 See de Lima-Dantas, supra note 75, at 10 (describing Cuba’s economic role 
in Spain’s empire). 
82 “Creole” referred to persons of Spanish ancestry born on the island of 
Cuba.  K. Scott Kohanowski, Book Annotations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 829, 837 
(2000). 
83 Christina Burnett points out that the Creole representatives from various 
colonies were outnumbered by the Peninsulares from Spain and thus could not 
give full effect to their needs.  Christina Duffy Burnett, “They say I am not an 
American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 659, 684 (2008). 
84 See William O. Walker III, Cuba and the Roots of U.S. Foreign Relations, 20 
DIPLOMATIC HIST. 125, 125 (1996) (suggesting that it is impossible to understand 
the history and development of U.S. foreign policy without studying the United 
States’ relationship with Cuba). 
85 This policy, created largely by Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and 
James Monroe, is known as the Monroe Doctrine.  See Michael Wallace Gordon, 
Thinking About Cuba: Post-Castro Cuba Began a Decade Ago, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 311, 
313 (2003) (discussing the United States’ rejection of European influence in the 
Western hemisphere and its interest in the annexation of Cuba); Jeffrey J. 
Malanson, The Congressional Debate over U.S. Participation in the Congress of Panama, 
1825–1826: Washington’s Farewell Address, Monroe’s Doctrine, and the Fundamental 
Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy, 30 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 813, 816–17 (2006) (discussing 
the basic principles of the Monroe Doctrine). 
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political and commercial interests of our Union. . . .  There are laws 
of political as well as physical gravitation . . . .”86 
When Mexico and Venezuela moved to support Cuban efforts 
to achieve independence, however, subsequent Secretary of State 
Henry Clay quietly let them know that the United States would 
thwart any effort to pry Cuba free from Spain because of concerns 
that a slave-free Cuba would affect the institution of slavery in the 
southern United States.87 
In 1834 Spain appointed General Miguel Tacón as its Captain-
General of Cuba, with dictatorial powers.  Tacón’s rule marked the 
beginning of a sixty year period marked by repression, revocation 
of civil rights, and denial of representation.  Nonetheless, during 
this period Cubans organized themselves, both within Cuba and in 
exile communities, in struggles for independence.  During this 
period the United States also made several overtures to Spain to 
purchase the island. 
In 1868 Carlos Manuel de Céspedes proclaimed the 
independence of Cuba in the Grito de Yara.  War broke out shortly 
thereafter.  De Céspedes and other leaders of the revolution were 
men of wealth who fought for the rights of hacienda owners, 
whereas the ranks of their armies were filled with the poor, who 
fought largely for the end of slavery and a change in the way of life 
in Cuba.  As the historian Philip Foner points out: “Inevitably, a 
conflict emerged between these two types of objectives.”88  For the 
next couple of decades independence fighters and the Spanish 
fought deadly but inconclusive battles.  Throughout this period the 
United States remained neutral. 
The end of U.S. neutrality brought an end to hostilities, and to 
Spanish rule of Cuba.  The Spanish-American war, fought on many 
seas and for many reasons, concluded with a new master for Cuba 
in the form of the U.S. military or provisional governors.  Although 
the Cuban Liberation Army fought alongside the United States 
forces in the war against Spain, and although Spain formally ceded 
 
86 See Merze Tate, The Australasian Monroe Doctrine, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 264, 270 
(1961) (citing Letter from John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State to Hugh Nelson, 
U.S. Minister to Spain, (Apr. 28, 1823), 32 Congress, 1 session, 121, at 6–7). 
87 See GILLIAN GUNN, CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 4 (1993) 
(describing the U.S. reaction to Cuba’s bid for independence). 
88 PHILIP S. FONER, A HISTORY OF CUBA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED 
STATES Vol. II 1845–1895, at 189 (1963). 
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control to the Cuban assembly, the United States governed Cuba 
for almost a decade. 
The end of U.S. rule brought little clarity to the governance of 
Cuba, nor did it necessarily result in the fruition of the visions of 
the common people who had fought for independence from Spain.  
The outgoing American Governor strongly favored election of the 
first President, who in turn was despised and driven out of office 
by opposition parties.  Cuba experienced a steady turnover of 
governments over the next fifty years, ending with the seizure of 
power in 1952 by Fulgencio Batista, who had already served one 
term as President.  “Between 1902 and 1959 Cuba floundered 
politically, since it had no experience with democracy. . . .  [T]he 
political turmoil was at times severe . . . .”89 
The United States’ relationship with Cuba during this period 
was not entirely benign.  The United States exercised military 
control over Cuba twice more.  Far more insidious was the 
introduction of organized crime.  Criminal organizations from the 
United States fostered connections with Cuba “beginning with the 
export of illegal liquor to the United States during prohibition and 
expanding into prostitution, gambling, and drugs.”90  Batista 
assiduously cultivated relationships with organized crime from the 
United States, turning Havana into a “Latin Las Vegas.”91 
Legitimate businesses also invested in Cuba.  By the 1950s, the 
United States accounted for more than half of all Cuban exports 
and imports, and a majority of foreign investment as well.  
Nonetheless, although “the Cuban economy experienced 
tremendous growth during this period . . . the benefits derived 
from this economic growth were not equally distributed among the 
island’s population, thus creating the perfect arena for the ‘Castro 
Revolution’ in 1959.”92  Remarks attributed to President Kennedy 
summarize the United State’s relationship with Cuba: 
 
89 Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as’ Race and 
Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 86 (1998). 
90 Joseph C. Sweeney, Guantanamo and U.S. Law, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 673, 
688 (2007). 
91 Luz Estella Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin 
America, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1649, 1659–60 (2003); see also ETHAN A. 
NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 272 (1993) (“In return for cash payments to the Cuban dictator, 
the American criminals were provided with lucrative casino concessions as well 
as substantial freedom in the conduct of their other criminal activities.”). 
92 Sandrino-Glasser, supra note 89, at 86–7. 
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I believe there is no country in the world, including all of 
the African regions . . . where economic colonization, 
humiliation and exploitation were worse than Cuba, in part 
owing to my country’s policies during the Batista 
regime. . . . I will go even further:  to some extent it is as 
though Batista was the incarnation of a number of sins on 
the part of the United States.93 
On January 1, 1959, Cuban revolutionaries lead by Che 
Guevara and Fidel Castro seized control of Cuba.  Over the next 
three years the Cuban government nationalized most foreign 
investment, including the hotels, casinos, oil refineries, nickel 
mines, and sugar processing plants that had been controlled by 
U.S. entities.  In 1960 President Eisenhower imposed the first 
economic embargo on Cuba, which retaliated by severing ties with 
the United States.94  Cuba proclaimed itself communist shortly 
thereafter and strengthened ties with the Soviet Union.95 
The period since the revolution has been one of Cuba’s most 
stable in the last century and a half.  That stability has not, 
however, been marked by political openness and democracy.  To 
the contrary, Cuba represses political dissent, severely limits the 
press, and monitors activities of its citizens.96 
To summarize the Cuban experience, Cuba’s history essentially 
begins with the Spanish occupation of the island, and most of its 
history is a history of foreign domination.  Cubans have very little 
experience with democracy, or with economic opportunity.97  
 
93 MARK FALCOFF, CUBA THE MORNING AFTER: CONFRONTING CASTRO’S LEGACY 
8 (2003). 
94 See David Mowry, Lifting the Embargo Against Cuba Using Vietnam as a 
Model: A Policy Paper for Modernity, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 229, 235–36 (1999) 
(describing the first economic embargo against Cuba). 
95 Id. at 236 (“Cuba would have almost surely met with economic and social 
ruin if the former Soviet Union had not provided billions in annual aid.”). 
96 See FREEDOM HOUSE, COUNTRY REPORT: CUBA (2008), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country 
=7378 (describing the limits imposed upon Cuban citizens by its government). 
97 See THOMAS D. BOSWELL & JAMES R. CURTIS, THE CUBAN-AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE: CULTURE, IMAGES, AND PERSPECTIVES 16 (1984) (“The long period of 
Spanish domination played a major role in forming Cuban culture.  The language, 
religion, economic institutions, and social structure of Spain were transferred to 
the island.  Spanish law and policy kept the government highly centralized and, 
along with trade, in the hands of Spaniards.  Virtually no industry developed.  
Sugar and, to a lesser extent, tobacco became the major cash crops.  Society was 
highly stratified, with relatively few rich families and a large mass of poor people, 
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Cuba’s relationship with the United States has not necessarily been 
beneficial for most Cubans.  Cubans today do not always have 
unfettered access to information from outside Cuba.  And Cuba 
suffers drastic sanctions intended to change the behavior of the 
Cuban government.98 
4. UNDERSTANDING CHANGE 
The sanctions attempt to effectuate a change in behavior.  A 
great number of schools of social sciences agree that institutions 
shape behavior.99  The word “institution” is used to describe a 
variety of social artifacts;100 this Article uses the word in the same 
manner as do institutional economists such as Douglass North,101 
development theorists such as Barbara Thomas-Slayter,102 or 
 
many of whom lived as peasants in a predominantly rural environment.  In short, 
it was not a life of equal opportunities for all individuals.”). 
98 See JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
RELATIONS 360 (5th ed. 1996) (“Exaggerated views of the Cuban revolution’s threat 
to U.S. business and political interests, suspicions that Castro was a Communist, 
and Castro’s declarations that he would not tolerate manipulation of Cuba by the 
U.S. government led to open U.S. hostility toward Cuba, a break in diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, and a U.S. policy of welcoming refugees from 
Cuba’s ‘Communist oppression’ to the ‘free world.’”). 
99 See, e.g., John Groenewegen, Frans Kerstholt & Ad Nagelkerke, On 
Integrating New and Old Institutionalism: Douglass North Building Bridges, 29 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 467, 467 (1995) (“Definitions of institution refer to a framework of behavior: 
institutions direct, channel, or guide behavior.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew 
S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 372 (1998) 
(describing institutionalism in international relations theory). 
100 Joel Trachtman, an institutional economist, understands that use of the 
term “institution” can encompass formal organizations and rules as well as 
informal, non-legal organizations.  Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the 
Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional 
Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470, 473 n.18 (1997).  In legal scholarship, the 
word “institution” often refers simply to a large organization.  See, e.g., Jacob E. 
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 
588 (2007) (discussing the structuring of political institutions). 
101 See Groenewegen, Kerstholt & Nagelkerke, supra note 99, at 471–72 
(discussing North and his work). 
102 See Barbara P. Thomas-Slayter, Structural Change, Power Politics, and 
Community Organizations in Africa: Challenging the Patterns, Puzzles and Paradoxes, 
22 WORLD DEV. 1479, 1480 (1994) (“Institutions are the core of our social systems, 
determining how people interact with one another, and constituting the rules by 
which people conduct their lives.”). 
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sociologists such as Paul DiMaggio.103  In trying to synthesize the 
subtleties of the different flavors of these schools of thought, David 
Dequech states that “one may broadly define institutions as socially 
shared patterns of behavior and/or thought.”104  These “previously 
established sets of guidelines within which a given group of people 
relate to one another . . . form the patterned expectations of 
behavior for members of that group.”105  Thus, institutions include 
both the interoperative platform that makes human interaction 
possible106 and “the rules of the games” played upon that 
platform.107  Institutions allow people to create and enforce 
relationships. 
 
103 See Klaus Nielsen, Institutionalist Approaches in the Social Sciences: Typology, 
Dialogue, and Future Challenges, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 505, 507–08 (2001) (discussing 
DiMaggio’s use of the term “institutionalism”). 
104 David Dequech, Institutions and Norms in Institutional Economics and 
Sociology, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 473, 473 (2006).  Others, not seeking to synthesize 
schools of thought, agree with this definition.  See, e.g., Paul D. Bush, The Theory of 
Institutional Change, in 1 EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS: FOUNDATIONS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 125, 126 (Marc J. Tool ed., 1988) (“[A]n ‘institution’ may 
be defined as a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behavior.”); 
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Cause and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) 
(“[R]egimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area.”). 
105 Thomas-Slayter, supra note 102, at 1480. 
106 See Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY 27, 37 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994) (defining 
institutions “as cognitive formations (categories, typifications, scripts) entailing 
constitutive understandings upon which action is predicated”).  As simple 
examples, social artifacts such as alphabets, language, salutations—all of which 
exist as shared understandings and expectations—constitute institutions. 
107 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3–4 (1990) (“Institutions include any form of constraint 
that human beings devise to shape human interaction. . . . Institutional constraints 
include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under 
what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities.”); 
see also Yngve Ramstad, “Reasonable Value” Versus “Instrumental Value:” Competing 
Paradigms in Institutional Economics, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 761, 763 (1989) (describing 
institutions as “the ‘rule structure’ within which individuals must confine their 
activity subject to sanctions”).  Some scholars found tension between the two 
types of definitions.  Pavel Pelikan suggests that “[t]he roots of this difference are 
in the old conceptual dilemma encountered by several economists who have 
searched for an operationally clear definition of institutions, which can roughly be 
stated as follows: should institutions be defined as constraints, comparable to ‘the 
rules of a game,’ or as routines, meaning ‘specific ways of playing a game’?”  
Pavel Pelikan, Bringing Institutions Into Evolutionary Economics: Another View with 
Links to Changes in Physical and Social Technologies, 13 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 237, 
238 (2003). 
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Law is an institution.  Law inarguably acts as a shared set of 
expectations that allow persons to form and enforce 
relationships.108  Contract law, in particular, enables the creation of 
predictable and enforceable relationships and establishes rules of 
the game for a variety of privately created relationships.109 
Understanding law as an institution has more than a theoretical 
effect.  Ann and Robert Seidman describe a legislative drafting 
project in the People’s Republic of China.  The drafters sought to 
effect real social change through law, and in order to do so they 
sought a theoretical framework that could guide them in drafting 
laws.110  Prevalent theories of law, such as pluralism and public 
choice theory, offer only descriptions.111  The Seidmans describe 
how theory failed the drafters of law: 
Substantively, drafters had to devise legislative programs 
to resolve perceived social problems.  To do that without a 
theory to guide the search for solutions, drafters 
everywhere too often ran around like rats in a maze, 
looking for an exit by butting their heads at random spots 
in the wall.  Frequently, almost as if law served as a magic 
charm, their bills merely defined desired future states of 
affairs in normative terms, leaving the administrators to 
figure out how to get there.  When the administrators 
failed, the drafters simply imposed increasingly draconian 
criminal penalties.112 
 
108 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus 
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 339–40 (1989) (emphasizing that 
law is an institution); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA 
L. REV. 449, 476 (1992) (stating that law is an institution); Thomas-Slayter, supra 
note 102, at 1480 (“Thus, legal codes, land tenure systems, or marital 
arrangements can all be regarded as institutions.”). 
109 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming 
Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 839, 869 (1999) (“[C]ontract law, like other institutions of society, 
provide[s] an ethical corrective not central to the individualism of liberal political 
theory.  It is through institutions that society ethically orders itself.”); Janet T. 
Landa, Bounded Rationality of Homo Classificus: The Law and Bioeconomics of Social 
Norms as Classification, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1167, 1174 (2005) (“Contract law is an 
example of a formal institution . . . .”). 
110 Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting Legislation for Development: 
Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 19 (1996). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 22. 
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Recognizing law as an institution and understanding the role 
that institutions serve in facilitating relationships led to a 
framework that provided meaningful guidance to these drafters of 
laws: 
That theory rested on an institutionalist hypothesis: 
Institutions constitute society’s building blocks; law 
constitutes government’s chief instrument for creating and 
changing institutions.  The Project’s legislative theory 
therefore had to guide drafters in using law as an 
instrument for changing the repetitive patterns of social 
behaviours that comprised existing dysfunctional 
institutions.113 
Seidman and Seidman note that understanding the necessity of 
institutions to facilitate interaction is particularly important when 
attempting to inform new behaviors in emerging economies.114 
They also point out that “[n]o market operates in vacuo.”115  
Commercial activity consists of relationships, of human 
interaction.116  Therefore, “[e]ach [market] operates in the context 
of myriad institutions—governmental, private and in between. 
That is to say, knowledge of how those institutions work must lie 
at the very core of economic analysis and economic and legal 
policy-making.”117 
4.1. How Institutions Change 
The United States specifically states as a goal of its sanctions on 
Cuba a desire to bring Cuba’s behavior in line with that of other 
 
113 Id.  Other legal scholars have pointed out the practical applications that 
accrue from understanding the role of institutions.  Roderick Hills, for example, 
suggests that antidiscrimination laws signal to society which forums are 
appropriate for resolving “controversies about the propriety of stigma.”  Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution?  The Case Against the Transformation of 
Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1615–16 (1997). 
114 Seidman & Seidman, supra note 110, at 33. 
115 Id. 
116 See Joseph P. Cannon & William D. Perreault, Jr., Buyer-Seller Relationships 
in Business Markets, 36 J. MARKETING RES. 439, 440–44 (1999) (describing various 
theories and indicators of relationships in business, including legal bonds such as 
contracts). 
117 Seidman & Seidman, supra note 110, at 33. 
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democratic nations in the region.118  In general, these types of trade 
sanctions seek to align behaviors.  Institutional theory suggests 
that alignment of behavior requires an alignment of institutions.  
The “success” of these sanctions, therefore, depends largely on the 
extent to which institutions in the offending country change and 
function more like those in complying countries.  Sociologists 
describe the process whereby institutions change to resemble one 
another as a process of isomorphism.119 
Sociologists discuss three broad categories of factors that bring 
institutions into alignment with one another: normative 
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive isomorphism.120  
These processes need not be exclusive, but identifying each 
contributes to the rigor with which convergence in institutions can 
be analyzed. 
4.1.1. Normative Isomorphism 
Normative isomorphism describes the convergence of 
institutions that occurs under circumstances such as 
professionalization of a service or practice.121  Mark Mizruchi and 
Lisa Fein describe “normative isomorphism as a result of 
professionalization, involving two processes.  First, members of 
professions receive similar training (such as that received by 
physicians, attorneys, and university professors), which socializes 
them into similar worldviews.  Second, members of professions 
interact through professional and trade associations, which further 
 
118 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions on 
Cuba). 
119 See Christopher Marquis, Mary Ann Glynn & Gerald F. Davis, Community 
as Isomorphism and Corporate Social Action, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 925, 926 (2007) 
(describing isomorphism as “the resemblance of a focal corporation’s social 
practices to those of other corporations within its geographic community”). 
120 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. 
SOC. REV. 147, 150–53 (1983) (describing engines of isomorphic change); Mark S. 
Mizruchi & Lisa C. Fein, The Social Construction of Organizational Knowledge: A 
Study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative Isomorphism, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
653, 653 (1999) (acknowledging and applying the DiMaggio & Powell analysis). 
121 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking 
in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 101 n.108 (2008) (“The 
professionalization of a field often yields what has been termed ‘normative 
isomorphism,’ the standardizing effect that professional training, education, and 
networks exert on organizational behavior.”). 
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diffuses ideas among them.”122  Professionalization is 
representative rather than exhaustive of the means by which 
normative isomorphism may occur.  Whenever the people who 
influence the design and use of institutions learn to think in similar 
ways and share formational experiences, one can predict some 
degree of convergence in the structure of institutions.123 
Although jurisprudential scholars generally use neither the 
analytics nor the language of sociologists, the process of normative 
isomorphism probably accounts for a great deal of law.  With 
respect to trade, Robert Hudec describes the importance of the 
regular “seminars” held between U.S. and British economists and 
policymakers in laying a foundation for what would later become 
the international trade regime.124  Joseph Coppock, who helped to 
create the international regime, speaks of the collaboration in terms 
that fit within the process of normative isomorphism: 
I might say here that all of us working in this international 
economic realm had a very clear conception of what we 
were about.  And this derived from our living through the 
thirties, our study of the experience of the twenties and the 
thirties, as well as from our professional training. One thing 
that was embodied in the Lend-Lease Act of March ‘41, that 
there not be a big carryover, big holdover of international 
debts because of the bad experience after World War I, was 
very important.  So the negotiations out of the lend-lease 
obligations at the end of the war was an aspect of that.125 
The process described by Coppock has accelerated over time.  
Through a variety of mechanisms, some of which could be 
 
122 Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 120, at 657. 
123 See Robert Dingwall & Kerry Kidd, After the Fall . . . : Capitulating to the 
Routine in Professional Work, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 67, 73 (2003) (“The spread of 
higher education and credentialing has led to increasing homogeneity among 
those who form the elite cadres of organizations.  These common experiences, 
together with the networks created by subsequent training, specialty associations, 
participation in public service bodies, and the like, encourage organizational 
leaders to think and act in similar ways.”). 
124 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE 
DIPLOMACY 5–12 (2d ed. 1990) (describing economic cooperation between Great 
Britain and the United States). 
125 Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Oral History Interview with Joseph 
D. Coppock by Richard D. McKinzie, at 49 (1974), available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/coppockj.htm. 
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described as normative, the international commercial regime is 
undergoing a transformation that could metaphorically be 
described as professionalization.  As Pistor notes, “[t]he vehicle for 
building the legal architecture for global markets is the 
harmonization of law around the globe by way of developing legal 
standards.”126 
4.1.2. Mimetic Isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism describes a convergence of institutions 
due to copying or imitation.127  Entities sometimes turn to imitation 
during conditions of uncertainty.128  Because they cannot turn to 
experiences of their own for direction, they adopt a strategy of 
mimicking the choices that others have made.129  Interestingly, 
actors seem to feel that they can enhance the legitimacy of new 
institutions by replicating existing institutions.130 
The sources for mimicry vary.131  Perceived “success” of extant 
institutions can lead to imitation.132  For the purposes of this 
Article, however, the most interesting factor contributing to 
imitation is repeated and frequent interaction.133  Trade sanctions, 
by their nature, limit interaction. 
 
126 Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97 (2002). 
127 See Elizabeth H. Gorman, Explaining the Spread of Law Firm In-House 
Counsel Positions: A Response to Professor Chambliss, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1577, 1583 
(2006) (describing mimetic isomorphism). 
128 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the 
Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1615, 1641 (2004) (discussing mimetic isomorphism of professional 
networks responding to ambiguous legal requirements). 
129 Brad Tuttle & Jesse Dillard, Beyond Competition: Institutional Isomorphism in 
U.S. Accounting Research, 21 ACCT. HORIZONS 387, 392–93 (2007). 
130 See Ilídio Barreto & Charles Baden-Fuller, To Conform or To Perform? 
Mimetic Behaviour, Legitimacy-Based Groups and Performance Consequences, 43 J. 
MGMT. STUD. 1559, 1561 (2006) (describing attempts of organizations to legitimize 
new institutions through mimetic isomorphism). 
131 See Martin Lodge & Kai Wegrich, Control Over Government: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Governance Dynamics in German Public Administration, 33 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 213, 217 (2005) (“Mimicry draws on a variety of sources . . . .”). 
132 See D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter 
Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 231, 280 (2008) (“Those organizations mimicked are ones viewed as 
more successful or legitimate.”). 
133 See Pamela R. Haunschild & Anne S. Miner, Modes of Interorganizational 
Imitation: The Effects of Outcome Salience and Uncertainty, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 472, 
474–75 (1997) (discussing frequency-based imitation); Sokol, supra note 132, at 281 
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Empirical research indicates that imitation of successful 
institutions can actually lead to success for the imitator.  In a study 
of business organizations in emerging economies, for example, 
Lance Eliot Brouthers, Edward O’Donnell and John Hadjimarcou 
found that firms that had relationships with companies in Europe, 
Japan and the United States and that imitated strategies of those 
companies performed better than companies within their countries 
that did not (or could not) imitate those strategies.134  In a wider 
context, mimetic isomorphism observably contributes to the 
dissemination of best business practices.135 
Law is replete with incidents of mimetic isomorphism.  
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan suggest, for example, 
that mimetic isomorphism may account for the convergences that 
they observe in the rules created by corporate privacy officers.136  
Daniel Sokol suggests that competition (antitrust) law has 
converged globally as nations have imitated competition 
provisions found in trade agreements with the United States or 
Europe.137  Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks state that laws dealing 
with issues as varied as the environment, education, and war have 
converged through the process of imitation.138  Imitation influences 
law. 
4.1.3. Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism describes convergence in institutions as 
a response to incentives.139  Incentives may be positive (something 
 
(describing mimetic isomorphism “based on repeat iterations” in the context of 
antitrust compliance). 
134 Lance Eliot Brouthers, Edward O’Donnell & John Hadjimarcou, Generic 
Product Strategies for Emerging Market Exports into Triad Nation Markets: A Mimetic 
Isomorphism Approach, 42 J. MGMT. STUD. 225, 241–42 (2005). 
135 See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based 
Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 52 n.164 (2008) (emphasizing the 
importance of mimetic isomorphism to the dissemination of best business 
practices). 
136 Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 121, at 102 n.109. 
137 Sokol, supra note 132, at 280. 
138 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 648 (2004) (“As many 
commentators point out, the extent of isomorphism across states is 
remarkable . . . .”). 
139 See Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 120, at 657 (“Coercive isomorphism is 
driven by two forces: Pressures from other organizations on which a focal 
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that the actor would like to acquire)140 or negative (something that 
the actor would like to avoid).141  Entities align their institutions 
because they are told to do so—by governments, by society, by 
customers, or by any group on which those entities depend.142 
The European Union (“EU”) offers a very clear example of the 
process of coercive isomorphism.  Membership in the EU offers 
substantial benefits to potential members, including free access to a 
very large market, inclusion in the Common Agricultural Policy, 
infrastructure assistance, and a unified currency.143  Membership 
also confers on countries a measurable degree of prestige and 
legitimacy:  “For many people in these nations, joining the EU was 
a proud moment, symbolic of their democratic and economic 
accomplishments and their reentry into the community of their free 
European siblings.”144  Acceding to the EU, however, requires an 
almost complete alignment of existing legal institutions with those 
of the EU.145  The laws and regulations of an applicant must 
 
organization is dependent and an organization’s pressure to conform to the 
cultural expectations of the larger society.”). 
140 See, e.g., Isin Guler et al., Global Competition, Institutions, and the Diffusion of 
Organizational Practices: The International Spread of ISO 9000 Quality Certificates, 47 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 207, 212 (2002) (“[D]ependent organizations are likely to adopt 
patterns of behavior sanctioned by the organizations that control critical 
resources.”). 
141 See, e.g., Tuttle & Dillard, supra note 129, at 393 (“If the influencing group 
has sufficient power, change may be mandated.”). 
142 See James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 
218, 242–55 (2003) (discussing the coercive isomorphism effects resulting from the 
imposition of social norms on nonprofit fiduciary behavior). 
143 Natalie Shimmel, Welcome to Europe, But Please Stay Out: Freedom of 
Movement and the May 2004 Expansion of the European Union, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
760, 763 (2006); see also Andrew Moravcsik & Milada Anna Vachudova, National 
Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement 3 (Ctr. for European Studies, Working 
Paper No. 97, 2003), available at http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu 
/publications/docs/pdfs/Moravcsik_Vachudova.pdf (“East European states take 
part in the laborious accession process because EU membership brings 
tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits—particularly as compared to the 
uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being left behind as others move 
forward.”). 
144 Shimmel, supra note 143, at 763. 
145 See John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union: Where 
Is It Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 923, 951–52 (1996) (noting that acceding members may 
not “question or substantially modify the institutional structure, scope, policies or 
rules of . . . the Union”); Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 329, 332 (2004) (“[C]ountries acceding to the European Union must embrace the 
acquis communitaire: To acquire the benefits of membership and avoid the costs of 
exclusion, they must make the domestic policy and institutional changes 
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comply in their entirety to the acquis communautaire of the EU—the 
corpus of directives, rules, regulations, and interpretations created 
by the EU over its lifetime.146 
The possibility of acceding to the EU has transformed the 
former Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe; those 
seeking to join the EU have “recreate[d] themselves in the EU’s 
image.”147  Indeed, “the outcome of research conducted so far on 
the deployment and effectiveness of EU conditionality in the pre-
accession process strongly indicates that a credible membership 
perspective has been a necessary condition for effective impact on 
domestic change.”148  The former Soviet countries are not the only 
nations that have substantially realigned institutions.  Prior to 
accession to the EU, military dictatorships ruled Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain; “they were strongly encouraged to become democracies 
by the enticement of EU membership.”149  Even strongly 
democratic countries, such as Ireland, substantially changed laws 
so as to align them with the EU’s requirements.150  Even countries 
with accession hopes as controversial as Russia’s and Turkey’s 
 
demanded by Brussels.”); see also Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The 
Accession Procedure for the Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 LOY. INT’L L. 
REV. 15, 21–53 (2003) (describing and explaining in detail each step of the 
accession process). 
146 Shimmel, supra note 143, at 774; see generally Antje Wiener, The Embedded 
Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance, 4 EUR. L.J. 
294 (1998) (describing acquis communautaire). 
147 Helen E. Hartnell, Subregional Coalescence in European Regional Integration, 
16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 115, 127 (1997). 
148 Amichai Magen, The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 411 (2006) 
(emphasis added).  Magen emphasizes that research indicates that “a credible 
prospect of EU accession coupled with low domestic costs of adaptation have 
both been necessary as well as sufficient conditions for compliance.”  Id. at 411–12. 
149 Stuart E. Eizenstat, U.S. Relations with the European Union and the Changing 
Europe, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 12 (1995); see Desmond Dinan, Fifty Years of 
European Integration: A Remarkable Achievement, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1118, 1139 
(2008) (“The impossibility of enjoying the economic benefits of EU membership 
without being democratic and respecting fundamental rights strengthened 
progressive forces in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, as those countries emerged 
from dictatorial rule in the mid-1970s, and subsequently in Eastern Europe 
following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.”). 
150 See Bryan Mercurio, Abortion in Ireland: An Analysis of the Legal 
Transformation Resulting from Membership in the European Union, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 141, 179 (2003) (“Ireland operated under the misguided theory that it 
could separate the economic benefits of EU membership from its social and moral 
policies.  It soon realized, however, that the EU brings an inseparable collection of 
economic, social, and political values and benefits.”). 
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have changed institutions so that those institutions align more 
closely with those of the EU.151 
5. ISOMORPHISM AND TRADE SANCTIONS INTENDED TO CHANGE 
BEHAVIOR 
The language and analytics of sociology provide legal scholars 
with new tools to explain and predict changes that can be 
effectuated through the use of sanctions.  Trade sanctions could 
have an effect on each of the three processes of institutional 
alignment described in the preceding Section. 
5.1. Normative Isomorphism 
Normative isomorphism occurs when actors learn together, 
develop standards together, or join in existing standards.152  
Comprehensive trade sanctions or embargos obviously obviate the 
possibility for the targeted nation to participate in these processes.  
Indeed, excluding the targeted nation and its citizens from 
participation in “desirable”153 organizations could force them to 
participate in organizations that hold values contrary to those of 
the country imposing sanctions.  This, in turn, could cause the 
targeted country to align its institutions with those of the less 
desirable organization. 
It is possible that normative isomorphism has occurred in 
Cuba.  Cuba has been excluded from participation in the 
Organization of American States (“OAS”) since 1962 and is the 
only nation in the Western Hemisphere that is not an active 
member.154  On the other hand, Cuba did join the Soviet Union’s 
 
151 See Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the 
Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 547, 556 (2004) (“[M]oves toward eliminating the 
death penalty in Turkey and Russia are most likely motivated not out of opinio 
juris but rather in exchange for the benefits of membership in the economically 
and politically advantageous clubs of the European Union and the Council of 
Europe.”). 
152 See supra Section 4.1.1. 
153 In this case, “desirable” means desirable from the perspective of the 
sanctioning country. 
154 Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, The Third Summit of the Americas and 
the Thirty-First Session of the OAS General Assembly, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 173, 176 n.16 
(2002); see Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 58 (2001) (stating that the sanctions law “obligates the United 
States to oppose Cuban participation in the OAS and in international financial 
institutions”). 
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Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.155  Following admission to 
that Council, Cuba experienced a dramatic increase in the number 
of Soviet and Eastern European technical advisors and economic 
planners, thus increasing the likelihood of convergence in the 
nature of Soviet and Cuban institutions.156  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union did not deprive Cuba of nations with which it could 
associate; Cuba has formed close relationships with Venezuela and 
other nations whose norms probably do not represent those that 
the United States would like Cuba to learn.157  Just as Cuba once 
exchanged technical advisors with the Soviet bloc countries, it now 
exchanges advisors with Chavez’s Venezuela.158 
It is difficult to estimate the degree to which this level of 
socialization caused Cuban institutions to move toward those of 
the Communist bloc.159  One thing can be guessed with far more 
certainty:  the infusion of Soviet technical advisors did nothing to 
align Cuban institutions with those considered desirable by the 
United States. 
5.2. Mimetic Isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when entities mimic the 
institutions of others.160  Entities tend to turn to mimicry during 
 
155 Richard Szawlowski, Book Review, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 711 (reviewing 
reference book MEZHDUNARODNYE EKONOMICHESKIJE I NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKIJE 
ORGANIZATSII STRAN-CHLENOV SEV. SPRAVOCHNIK [THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF 
COMECON] (V. V. Vorontnikov & D. A. Lebin eds., 1980)) (discussing the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (“COMECON”) and Cuba’s 
membership). 
156 See Lawrence H. Theriot & JeNelle Matheson, Soviet Economic Relations 
with the Non-European CMEA: Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia, in A COMPENDIUM OF 
PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 96TH CONG., 551, 555  (1979) 
(describing the increase in technical and economic advisors). 
157 See Larry Catá Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, 
Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized 
Economic Regimes, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 43 & n.184 (2007) (describing the 
relationship between Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia in the Bolivarian Alternative 
for Latin America). 
158 See Luz Estella Nagle, Global Terrorism in Our Own Backyard: Colombia’s 
Legal War Against Illegal Armed Groups,  15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 55 
(2005) (describing the extent of the exchange between Venezuela and Cuba). 
159 See Edward Yates, Central Planning Meets the Neighborhood: Land Use Law 
and Environmental Impact Assessment in Cuba, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 653, 653–54 (2003) 
(describing Cuba’s choice to align itself with the Soviet Union). 
160 See supra Section 4.1.2. 
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conditions of uncertainty, and tend to copy the institutions of those 
with whom they have had repeated interaction. 
One effect of a comprehensive trade sanction or embargo is that 
it precludes the repeated interaction that may lead to mimicry.  
Cuba, cut off from interaction with democratic nations, could not 
easily copy those democratic nations’ institutions.  On the other 
hand, Cuba could easily copy the institutions of those nations who 
did not comply with the United State’s sanctions, and in particular 
with the Soviet countries.  One vivid example of this is the Cuban 
legal system, which President Fidel Castro ordered completely 
rewritten.161  The development of a legal system almost always 
requires mimicry—the development of a completely novel legal 
system is a staggering undertaking.162  The Cuban legal system, 
unsurprisingly, is a socialist legal system.163  Far from forcing Cuba 
to imitate the legal systems of democratic countries, the trade 
sanctions imposed by the United States virtually guaranteed that 
Cuba would mimic those of the countries engaged in a cold war 
with the United States. 
5.3. Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism describes the convergence of 
institutions in response to incentives; these incentives can be either 
negative or positive.164  Trade sanctions constitute a negative 
incentive. 
This Article does not purport to review the mass of economic 
indicator-based literature evaluating the effectiveness of the United 
States’ sanctions on Cuba.  The mass of evidence, however, 
suggests that punishment has not caused Cuba to change and in 
fact has given Cuba’s regime a plausible excuse for further 
 
161 It was unlikely that the existing Cuban legal system, developed during 
periods of foreign domination or political turmoil, would have survived scrutiny 
by the Cuban people. 
162 See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. 
REV. 1, 27 (1974) (discussing the reception of law); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants 
and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79, 80 (1976) (same).  Watson points to the 
wholesale reception of Roman law throughout Europe as an example of this 
widespread process.  ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 66–97  (1985). 
163 See Jessica Garcia, Made In America: Latin American Consumers Meet Their 
Maker, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 759, 761 (1998) (describing the infiltration of 
Castro’s Socialist regime into the Cuban legal system). 
164 See supra Section 4.1.1. 
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repressing the liberties of individual Cubans.165  It is important to 
understand the context in which these negative incentives are 
imposed:  Cubans do not have a democratic tradition to which they 
long to return, most Cubans traditionally did not have access to 
economic opportunity or to the markets, and Cubans who are old 
enough to recall the pre-revolution relationship with the United 
States are likely to remember organized crime and exploitation.166  
The “punishment” of not interacting with the United States may 
not seem overwhelmingly burdensome to many Cubans.167 
On the other hand, lack of interaction with sanctioning nations 
may actually enhance the perceived benefit of interaction with 
non-sanctioning nations, or even lead to dependency on those 
nations.168  Such was the case with Cuba.  Cuba became a client 
state of the Soviet Union,169 and on occasion acted in accordance 
with the Soviet Union’s wishes rather than its own.170  Using the 
language of sociologists, exclusion from association with 
sanctioning states makes the positive incentives offered by non-
sanctioning states more attractive and thus perversely increases the 
likelihood of coercive isomorphism with the institutions of those 
nations. 
The corollary of this observation is that trade sanctions do not 
offer, indeed they preclude, positive incentives for regime change.  
Most examples of coercive isomorphism, however, are the result of 
positive incentives.  The EU’s significant effect on the institutions 
of potential members, for example, is not the result of threats made 
 
165 See James M. Cooper, Creative Problem Solving and the Castro Conundrum, 28 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 391, 421 (1998) (quoting former Canadian Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien: “They’re just making it possible for Castro to stay in power, because he 
has an excuse, he can blame the Americans.”). 
166 See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
167 See Cooper, supra note 165, at 421–22 (explaining that the U.S. embargo 
against Cuba does not put the Castro regime in jeopardy). 
168 Theriot & Matheson, supra note 156, at 552  (“[E]xtensively isolated from 
the non-Communist trading community, a small nation’s dependence on a major 
power like the USSR inevitably grows; its autonomy in foreign policy is reduced, 
and some degree of subservience to Soviet global interests becomes 
unavoidable.”). 
169 See Colin Crawford, Environmental Justice in Cuba: Capital Needs, Developing 
a Tourist Infrastructure, and Liberty of Access to National Resources, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55–56 (2004) (identifying Cuba as a former client state of 
the Soviet Union and identifying some of the problems that accompanied that 
status). 
170 See Theriot & Matheson, supra note 156, at 552–53 (noting that Cuba only 
reluctantly supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia). 
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against those countries but instead is the result of substantial 
incentives offered.171 
5.4. A Lesson from Sociology 
Sociological theory regarding changes toward convergence in 
institutions offers a rigorous means of analyzing the probable 
effects of trade sanctions.  The preceding discussion also suggests a 
potentially fatal weakness of unilateral sanctions.  To the extent 
that sanctions are not coordinated among every country in the 
world, there will remain potential partners with whom the target 
country may associate and on whom the target country may come 
to depend.  This will only enhance the probability of normative, 
mimetic and even normative isomorphism. The convergence in 
institutions, however, will not be with the institutions of the 
sanctioning country.  Instead, the convergence will be with the 
institutions of countries that do not cooperate with the sanctioning 
country, countries whose institutions are more likely to be 
antithetical to those of the sanctioning country.  Institutions shape 
behavior.  Thus, an imperfectly coordinated sanction may actually 
be more likely to engender undesired behavior than it is to 
engender the desired behavior. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Trade sanctions have become a tool of choice in the last fifteen 
years.172  The important interface between trade sanctions and the 
international trade regime demands that legal scholars analyze 
trade sanctions with every tool at their disposal.  Positive legal 
theory, economic theory, and political sciences including 
international relations theory each provide useful perspectives.  
The valuable contributions from sociology, however, are often 
overlooked. 
 
171 See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text. 
172 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 
26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 53 (2001) (noting the increasing frequency of threats of 
unilateral sanctions given the prohibition of forcible interference in state affairs 
under customary international law); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts 
Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2002) (noting the increasing frequency of 
trade sanctions directed by the United Nations Security Council and requiring 
compliance by all states); see also Shauna C. Bryce, Life Plus Seventy: The Extension 
of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed Legislation in the United States, 
37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 525, 543 (1996) (noting in general that “[t]hreats of trade 
sanctions, for example, are frequently used”). 
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Some types of trade sanctions seek to change the behavior of 
targeted nations, and in particular seek to align the behavior of 
targeted nations with the “acceptable” behavior of the sanctioning 
nation and its peers.  Behavior is dependent on underlying 
institutions, such as law.  Institutional sociology offers theoretical 
explanations as to why entities’ institutions will converge.  As can 
be demonstrated with the United States’ embargo of the Republic 
of Cuba, theories of isomorphism can in fact explain the outcome 
of these types of trade sanctions. 
Theories of isomorphism can also predict the outcome of trade 
sanctions.  Theories of isomorphism offer a caution with respect to 
unilateral trade sanctions.  Unless those sanctions are carefully 
coordinated with other international actors, each of the theories of 
normative, mimetic, and even coercive isomorphism suggest that 
trade sanctions may actually produce the opposite of the desired 
outcome. 
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